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multiplicate influences of diverse power sources on exploration and exploitation and whether such 
influences on these two strategies are similar or different. This study investigates the joint effects of 
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impact is found in terms of exploitation. This study provides alternative insights about 
inter-organizational learning in asymmetric alliances and points out a direction for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates how allying with large partner firms that hold multiple types of power 
affects small firms’ exploration and exploitation. Exploitation relates to the making of incremental 
improvements to existing products using existing technologies or competencies, whereas exploration 
concerns the development of new products that depart from existing knowledge or technological 
trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993). Scholars have examined small firms’ exploration and/or 
exploitation strategies with their dominant partners in alliance settings (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; 
Velu, 2015; Yang, Zheng, and Zhao, 2014). Such asymmetric alliance relationships entail substantive 
power imbalance which dominant partners can draw on to force small firms to exploit or explore in a 
specific knowledge domain (Cheng, 2012). Given the fact that power in alliance settings is a 
multifaceted concept with diverse types or sources such as advantageous tangible assets, tacit 
knowledge, or position (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Perrons, 2009), small firms may perceive 
multiplicate influences from different power sources during their learning processes. Then, how do 
different types of power interact with each other in influencing exploration versus exploitation? 
Power imbalance has been recognized to affect alliance firms’ social psychological processes (Zeng 
and Chen, 2003) when coordinating and integrating boundary-spanning resources (Frazier and Rody, 
1991). According to Perrons (2009), small firms may be motivated to follow the partners’ footsteps 
and learn in certain areas because of their dependence on large partners’ capability or market status. In 
some situations, small firms may also be forced to exploit specific knowledge even if they do not 
intend to (Li and Rowley, 2002). Their initiatives to conduct exploration or exploitation are thus 
determined by motivational forces stemming from their power-dependence alliance relationships. This 
is verified by Katila, Rosenberg, and Eisenhardt (2008) who examined technology ventures’ resource 
acquisition when they ally with established, powerful firms. As indicated by Cheng (2012), perceived 
power may lead small firms to timely adjust their efforts and inputs in pursuing exploration versus 
exploitation. Nevertheless, the mainstream literature all examined the effect of one specific source of 
power on alliance firm’s exploration and/or exploitation, neglecting the multiplicate effects of 
multiple power sources in an asymmetric alliance. Moreover, exploration and exploitation are 
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associated with different levels of risks and management challenges (Enkel, Heil, Hengstler, and 
Wirth, 2017; Gilsing and Duysters, 2008; Yang et al., 2014), yet it is unclear whether perceived power 
may exert similar or different impacts on exploration versus exploitation.  
This study strives to fill the gaps by exploring the joint effects of two types of perceived power—
capability-driven power and position-driven power—on exploration versus exploitation in asymmetric 
alliances. Instead of drawing attention to dominant partners who exercise the power, the focus here is 
small firms who perceive power imbalance. It also investigates perceived power imbalance instead of 
real, objective power because a small firm’s judgment and strategic decision for learning are based on 
its perception of power (e.g., Bitektine, 2011). This paper unpacks what has been referred to as 
positional (Ibarra, 1993) and capability (Kankanhalli, Tan, and Wei, 2005; Mudambi and Navarra, 
2004) aspects of intra-dyad power. Position-driven power refers to the ability to evoke a change based 
on a position with entitlements as being endowed by formal business agreements (Gaski, 1984), and 
capability-driven power captures such an ability that stems from advantageous capabilities or 
resources. While both perceived position-driven power and perceived capability-driven power exert 
influence on a small firm’s knowledge-related activities in distinctive ways, they may also interact 
with each other (cf., Ibarra, 1993). Moreover, existing studies have suggested that a firm may combine 
different types of power when exerting influence on partners (Elking et al., 2017), which demonstrates 
an enhanced motivational force driving partners’ knowledge-related activities. This study thus devotes 
attention to the joint effects of positional and capability power. According to Venkatraman (1989), 
combinations of them can be created in two ways (also see, He and Wong, 2004): First, a combination 
can be defined as complementarity if the two types of perceived power each obtain high scores; 
Second, a combination can be defined as balanced if the two types of perceived power exhibit little 
absolute difference in terms of scores. This paper examines the complementary and balanced effects 
of perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power on exploration and exploitation, 
respectively.  
As one of the first that integrates different types of perceived power into the examination of 
exploration/exploitation in alliances, the present study contributes to existing literature in two ways. 
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First, it adds to the understanding of inter-organizational learning in asymmetric alliances by revealing 
how learning can be driven when a dominant partner with diverse power sources exerts multiplicate 
influences. Prior studies have introduced power to explain alliance firms’ learning behaviors (Cheng, 
2012; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Li and Rowley, 2002), whilst little is known about small firm’s 
strategies of exploration and exploitation when allying with a partner that has diverse sources of 
power. By differentiating between perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power, this 
study suggests that small firms’ inter-organizational learning can be driven when these two types of 
power work in combination instead of independently. The findings show that the pursuit of 
exploratory and exploitative learning may relate to different configurations of perceived 
position-driven power and capability-driven power (i.e., balanced or complementary). 
Second, this study contributes to the literature on resource dependence between alliance partner 
firms. While Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory suggests that interfirm 
arrangements help manage interdependence and lead to enhanced performance (Drees and Heugens, 
2013), recent studies have switched their focus to how partner firms leverage interfirm knowledge and 
promote learning in the presence of dependence asymmetry (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Howard et al., 
2016; Katila, Thatchenkery, Christensen, and Zenios, 2017). Nevertheless, they all consider 
dependence asymmetry a precondition, neglecting its own role in promoting organizational learning in 
interfirm settings. The present study adds to this line of inquiry by introducing dependence asymmetry 
as a predictor of inter-organizational learning. Further, while existing bargaining power studies have 
indicated that different power bases may function either positively or negatively in affecting 
relationship and performance (e.g., Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, and Ambrose, 2013; Pulles, Veldman, 
Schiele, and Sierksma, 2014; Villena and Craighead, 2017), this study moves one step further, 
suggesting that different power bases interact with each other in driving partner firms’ learning-related 
behaviors. It thus opens a gate to exploring how the benefits of different types of power can be 
strengthened and the liabilities being weakened through synthesizing different power sources. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
 5
2.1 Power in interfirm contexts 
A classic definition of power at the individual level offered by Mechanic (1962, p.351) refers to 
“any force that results in behavior which would not have occurred if the force had not been present”, 
indicating the diversity of power sources residing in interpersonal and intra-organizational contexts. A 
power holder influences a target through positional bases such as coercion, reward, and legitimacy as 
well as personal or capability bases, including expert and referent (French and Raven, 1959). 
According to bargaining power theory (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981), an imbalance of power widely 
exists between organizations. Due to the stakes of alliance firms and the availability of alternatives, a 
large firm has the potential to exert influence over its small partners (Luo, 2006; Yan and Gray, 1994). 
When a small firm’s stakes lie in the resources that its dominant partner has, they will form a resource 
dependence relationship in which the control of critical resources constitutes interfirm power (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). While power imbalance exists between 
organizations in different forms and with diversified effects (Cheng, 2012; Elking et al., 2017), a full 
understanding of intra-dyad power could be helpful in improving alliance collaboration. 
As conceptualized here, intra-dyad power concerns the extent to which one partner firm enforces 
decisions over others (Johnson et al., 1993; Perrons, 2009). In order to clearly identify how intra-dyad 
power influences the functioning of asymmetric relationships, the present study here differentiates 
between two types of power, namely position-driven power and capability-driven power, to capture 
formal and informal aspects of power. Scholars have mainly referred to either formal or informal 
aspect of power bases for imposing decisions over partner firms in alliance contexts (Gaski, 1984; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Kankanhalli et al., 2005; Mudamdi and Navarra, 2004). An alliance firm 
may obtain position-driven power when it reaches formal business agreements and draws on its 
advantageous position in such a formal relationship to enforce decisions. It may also exert informal 
influences over its partner firms if it possesses advantageous resources or capabilities. Moreover, the 
identification of positional and capability dimensions of power falls right into the track of the 
differentiation between coercive aspects of intra-dyadic power and softer power bases discussed in 
prior studies (e.g., Doherty and Alexander, 2006; Quinn and Doherty, 2000). The positional aspect of 
power is suggested to be coercive. In the frame of formal alliance agreements, an advantageous 
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position is associated with rights to enforce decisions. When an alliance firm takes up a position with 
entitlements to interfere with partner’s alliance activities, the stakes at hand will cause this partner 
firm to accept any reinforcements (Pulles et al., 2014). In contrast, capability aspect of power is 
supposed to be softer in influencing partner firms’ behaviors (cf. Gawer, 2009). This is because 
advantageous knowledge or capabilities can be used to guide instead of controlling behavior 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2005). While power is a concept prevailing in individual-level studies, the 
differentiation between position-driven power and capability-driven power in alliances is analogous to 
the conceptualization of individual power that relates to positional (i.e., coercive, reward, and 
legitimate) and personal bases (i.e., referent and expert) (French and Raven, 1959). As conceptualized 
here, position-driven power stems from the dominance of an alliance relationship which is endowed 
by formal business agreements (Gaski, 1984). It is thus associated with rewards and punishments, 
which is similar to positional power at the individual level. Capability-driven power stems from an 
alliance firm’s advantageous expertise or capabilities, which is analogous to individual’s personal 
bases of power demonstrated by French and Raven (1959). 
Specifically, position-driven power demonstrates the potential to enforce decisions by advocating 
positional advantages endowed by formal business agreements. For example, a platform owner, even 
an emergent one with low capability, has positional advantages to integrate and distribute resources 
among other participants on this platform. Position in an alliance relationship describes how the firm 
is contractually related to other firms (Olsen et al., 2014), referring to attributes such as stakes in the 
partnership, promised inputs, entitlements, as well as associated rights to offer rewards and 
punishments. A strategic position, which demonstrates the potential to make promises of reward and 
to deliver the promised outcomes (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), represents the privilege of extracting 
and distributing relationship value and information flow between partners (Sydow and Windeler, 
1998). Positional advantages are widely considered as the facilities of rules design and integration in 
partnerships (e.g., Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Ibarra, 1993), which could inevitably affect the ways 
partners embed into the relationship. By obtaining a strategic position, a firm ensures the control of 
the reinforcements (e.g., rewards or punishments) that guide its partner firm’s behavior (Tedeschi, 
Schlenker, and Lindskold, 1972). In this sense, a small firm perceiving such power may be forced to 
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conduct activities its dominant partner indicates. Therefore, perceived position-driven power can be 
considered as a pushing force on small firms’ behaviors.  
Capability-driven power is associated with advantageous capabilities or resources including 
tangible resources and intangible assets. For example, Amazon enjoys its leadership on its own online 
shopping platform, whereas Apple’s advantageous technology and brand ensure that the firm holds 
priority in the relationship with Amazon when selling products on this platform. Because a dominant 
partner’s capability advantages in interfirm contexts can always be helpful in upgrading the small 
firm’s technical or marketing capacity (Lin, Yang, and Arya, 2009), those that constitute distinctive, 
unique capabilities such as technical know-how, tacit knowledge, and patents result in dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), thereby indicating the imbalance of power (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005). Such asymmetric relationships allow the small firm to learn and grow while entailing a lower 
extent of coercion and inflexibility than the relationships with position-driven power. It could then 
motivate the small firm to contribute to joint activities (Zmud, 1984). When perceiving 
capability-driven power, the small firm may be attracted to spontaneously conduct activities its 
dominant partner alludes to. Thus perceived capability-driven power can be considered as a pulling 
force that drives the small firm toward conducting strategy-oriented, mutually beneficial behaviors. A 
comparison between position-driven power and capability-driven power can be seen in Table 1. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.2 The effects of perceived power on exploitation and exploration 
Bargaining power scholars have referred to interfirm learning when facing power imbalance and 
have relied on power exercise to predict firms’ responses in an inter-organizational relationship (e.g., 
Chae, Choi, and Hur, 2017; Howard, Withers, and Tihanyi, 2016; McEvily, Zaheer, and Kamal, 2017). 
When a large firm takes up a position with entitlements in an asymmetric relationship, it has the 
potential to draw on the small firm’s stakes at hand to exert influence. Because the power imbalance 
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in the relationship can be forceful and coercive (e.g., Etgar, 1976), the small firm could be compelled 
to adopt or develop knowledge that it did not intend to. The influences a large firm holds over the 
small firm may stem from valuable, critical resources or capabilities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Dependence on such resources or capabilities could also promote the small firm to conduct learning 
following the large firm’s footsteps even if it is not forced to (Perrons, 2009). When the small firm 
perceives influences and power imbalance in an asymmetric relationship, it may be motivated to 
exploit or explore within organizational boundaries (Cheng, 2012). From this perspective, perceived 
power may influence interfirm knowledge flow, and will also affect the input of integrating, 
processing, and transforming product knowledge within organizational boundaries.  
While perceived power has the potential to drive exploitation and exploration, the functioning of 
different types can be different. Perceived position-driven power is supposed to push the small firm in 
the direction the dominant partner suggests. This is because, according to bargaining power theory 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1981), a small firm to acquire economic rewards or avoid economic 
punishments is forced to enhance its commitment and then, its motivation to process existing 
knowledge or to seek new knowledge (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Jap, 2001). Processing existing 
knowledge (exploitation) legitimizes the firm’s rent-seeking activities, while seeking and generating 
new knowledge (exploration) improves its bargaining position when requesting increasing economic 
rewards. In contrast, perceived capability-driven power helps create an atmosphere in which the small 
firm inherently desires to bond with the dominant partner to learn and grow (Frazier and Summers, 
1984), thereby pulling the small firm toward exploration and exploitation. In essence, small firms 
normally expect to obtain extensive support (e.g., goal-framing and problem-solving) from their 
dominant partners (Lindenberg and Foss, 2011) so that the partners’ resources or capability might be 
leveraged to improve their own R&D capacity (Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 2009). Such an 
expectation motivates them to deepen their relationships with their large partners, thus enhancing their 
willingness to accelerate exploratory and exploitative learning (see, Selnes and Sallis, 2003). 
Specifically, the desire to create variety in experience and capacity calls for exploratory learning, 
whereas the desire to create reliability requires exploitative learning (Holmqvist, 2004). To summarize, 
the ‘push-pull’ effects imposed by perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power 
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enhance the small firms’ willingness to contribute to interrelated activities (Zmud, 1984), thereby 
shaping their behaviors toward exploration and exploitation. 
However, there exists an opposite tendency through which perceived power brings about 
detrimental impacts on exploitation and exploration. Specifically, because position-driven power 
relates to coercion and control, it may incur conflict and distrust (Das and Teng, 1998; Gaski, 1984), 
and will also result in inflexibility in terms of knowledge searching and development (Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Capability-driven power is supposed to be less 
coercive than position-driven power and thus, may cause less inflexibility and conflict. Nevertheless, 
a lack of perceived coercion and economic reinforcements may weaken the interaction between 
alliance partners and lead to low relationship commitment (Cook and Emerson, 1978), which causes a 
failure of driving relationship-specific learning activities (cf. Foucault, 1980).  
Because perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power have the potential for both 
positive and detrimental impacts on exploration and exploitation, the present study argues that a 
combination of these two could provide us with a clearer picture of the impacts in such situations. 
Using two alternative measures of joint effects adapted from Venkatraman (1989) and He and Wong 
(2004), complementarity and balance, this paper examines how the two types of power jointly affect 
exploratory and exploitative learning. Complementarity means that they add value to each other to 
promote organizational learning, i.e., there is an interaction effect between these two on learning 
strategies. In contrast, balance refers to a match of these two power types, i.e., an absolute difference 
(He and Wong, 2004). It is expected that different configurations of perceived position-driven power 
and capability-driven power influence exploitation and exploration in different ways, as discussed in 
the following sections.  
 
2.3 The complementary effect of perceived positional and capability power 
This study argues that perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power can 
complement each other in ways that enhance the positive impacts and alleviate the negative impacts in 
pursuit of knowledge exploration. First, a complementary effect is concerned with enhancing each of 
their functions (i.e., push and pull) in developing novel conceptions. While perceived 
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capability-driven power acts as a pulling force that drives the acquisition and development of new 
knowledge, such a benefit goes beyond knowledge access by leveraging the factors based on 
perceived positional control. Perceived position-driven power ensures the consistency of 
decision-making and behaviors between partner firms and brings about a legitimacy effect (Koka and 
Prescott, 2008). According to Podolny (2001), behavior consistency leads to a situation in which the 
small firm’s learning benefits both itself and the whole relationship, thereby enhancing the dominant 
partner’s willingness to involve itself in the small firm’s knowledge-related activities. This could then 
strengthen the ‘pulling’ effect of perceived capability-driven power on exploratory learning as both 
parties could be driven to devote time and energy to the relationship. Further, perceived positional 
control may lead the small firm to foster common knowledge about working procedures or 
experiences with its dominant partner (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), which could be helpful in 
promoting the process through which perceived capability-driven power drives the exploration of 
novel technologies. Similarly, while perceived position-driven power promotes exploratory learning 
by providing economic reinforcements (Frazier and Rody, 1991), such benefit may be enhanced by 
capability-driven power. Perceived position-driven power relies on economic reinforcements to drive 
a small firm’s exploratory behaviors, while the willingness to take the behaviors is highly dependent 
on the size of the reinforcements. Within the frame of behavior pulling induced by capability-driven 
power, the small firm can be further motivated to take risks of exploring in uncertain technological 
fields or market areas. The rationale is that the small firm normally tends to bond with the dominant 
partner to enhance its R&D capacity, thus complementing the positional forces which are normally 
associated with the exchange of information limited by alliance participants’ alternatives (Bacharach 
and Lawler, 1980) and then increasing the chances of successful exploration (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004). By engaging in a relationship where the two types of perceived power co-exist, the small firm 
can easily accept and comply with the perceived positional control because it obtains returns 
exceeding the benefits of economic reinforcements (Perrons, 2009), thereby increasing the possibility 
that the ‘pushing’ force drives the development of novel technologies.  
Second, such complementarity also refers to the alleviation of negative impacts when developing 
new knowledge. As mentioned above, position-driven power could lead to resistance that hampers 
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boundary-spanning learning. Such resistance stems from the tension which may occur if the small 
firm is unlikely to acquire as much value as is being appropriated by the dominant partner (e.g., Li et 
al., 2008). Because capability-driven power opens a gate to enhance the small firm’s capacity, which 
reduces the extent of imbalance in relational exchange (i.e., the dominant partner is supposed to gain 
more benefits than the small firm), a significant transformation of collaboration attitude could then be 
expected in the direction of deep embeddedness. Meanwhile, the dominant partner that possesses both 
positional and capability advantages are supposed to be reliable in leading interfirm activities, thus 
causing little resistance when creating, extracting, and distributing relationship value. Consequently, 
while position-driven power relies largely on perceived coercion to proceed with the small firm’s 
development of new technologies, capability-driven power could reduce the impression of coercion 
by transferring the impression of informal influence (Frazier and Rody, 1991; Das and Teng, 1998). 
Taken together, although perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power each brings 
about positive and detrimental effects on knowledge exploration, a combination could lead to positive 
impacts. This study thus hypothesizes that, 
Hypothesis 1: Complementary position-driven power and capability-driven power is positively 
associated with knowledge exploration. 
In a similar vein, this paper posits that the two types of perceived power complement each other in 
driving exploitation. More specifically, they could enhance each other’s functions in promoting the 
small firm’s exploitative learning. The impact of capability-driven power on pulling the small firm 
toward improving existing technologies could be enhanced by position-driven power because 
economic reinforcements ensure the consistency of decision-making and behaviors as well as the 
motivation of internal knowledge processing. The pushing effect of position-driven power on the 
small firm’s exploitative behaviors could also be strengthened by capability-driven power as it 
increases the small firm’s willingness to bond with the dominant partner. Furthermore, the 
complementarity also relates to the alleviation of each other’s negative impacts. The potential 
conflicts caused by positional attributes can be significantly alleviated by capability advantage 
because it navigates the relationship toward enhanced mutual dependence and trust (Dekker, 2004). 
Although perceived positional advantages may relate to the risks of knowledge appropriation (Katila 
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et al., 2008), such mutual dependence and trust reduces the small firm’s feeling of uncertainty in 
pursuing knowledge exploitation (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Therefore, it is expected that 
complementarity between the two types of power promotes exploitation by maintaining productivity 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003) and achieving reliability and organizational renewal (Stettner and Lavie, 
2014). This study then hypothesizes, 
Hypothesis 2: Complementary position-driven power and capability-driven power is positively 
associated with knowledge exploitation. 
 
2.4 The balanced effect of perceived positional and capability power 
Alternatively, knowledge exploration may be driven by striking a balance between perceived 
position-driven power and capability-driven power. The balanced effect implies equilibrium between 
these two. The benefits stemming from them could then be well leveraged, thus leading to a situation 
in which both forces act as impetuses of exploration.  
Successful knowledge exploration requires that the small firm conducts persistent external 
searching and in-house experimental activities (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). However, an imbalanced 
state of the two types of perceived power may fail to promote the small firm’s exploration. When 
position-driven power is strong and capability-driven power is weak, the small firm will mostly be 
motivated by its dominant partner’s economic reinforcements. Due to the lack of strong 
capability-driven power, the small firm’s focus will be on the pursuit of short-term interests instead of 
the exploration of uncertain technological domains. Thereafter, it may not be willing to conduct high 
investments but rather, prefers in-house experimental activities with low risks and high efficiency, 
thereby driving out exploratory behaviors. Alternatively, if capability-driven power is strong and 
position-driven power is weak, the small firm will be motivated to conduct external knowledge 
searching and exploration but may find it difficult to invest persistently into exploratory behaviors due 
to the lack of economic rewards. As small firms are normally weak in capability, they will need 
continuous economic returns to support their operations. Given the situation of weak position-driven 
power, a small firm may not obtain enough economic incentives from the relationship that sustain its 
long-term exploration. Even if strong capability-driven power could pull the small firm toward 
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searching new knowledge, it would not be a sustainable way to drive knowledge exploration. 
Moreover, because of the limited economic reinforcements in coordinating interfirm strategies and 
behaviors, the small firm may choose to use the acquired knowledge in ways that benefit itself rather 
than the alliance relationship (Teece, 2000), thereby leading to ineffectiveness in pursuing 
boundary-spanning synergy. 
Further, a state of imbalance between the two types of power may evoke the detrimental impacts 
they are likely to exert on exploration. When position-driven power is strong and capability-driven 
power is weak, the small firm may reduce its exploration due to the concern of conflicts. Specifically, 
the lack of the pulling effect may increase the possibility of conflicts because too much 
position-driven power could lead to distrust and low commitment (Frazier and Rody, 1991). In some 
extreme situations, the small firm may choose backward or forward integration to avoid the 
ineffectiveness stemming from conflicts, thereby increasing the input along the existing technological 
trajectory at the expense of investing in knowledge exploration. When position-driven power is weak 
and capability-driven power is strong, there is a low risk of conflicts but also low relationship 
commitment, which predicts low exploration in the relationship. In the absence of positional 
advantages, the detrimental impact of lowered relationship commitment may be expanded because the 
small firm is not able to obtain enough economic returns from the relationship. This may significantly 
reduce the small firm’s motivation to explore in uncertain technological fields or market areas. 
A balanced position-driven power and capability-driven power implies that the pulling and pushing 
forces have similar strengths, which ensures that both of the two types of perceived power could play 
their respective roles in promoting the small firm’s exploratory learning. The balance in the 
configuration of power may relate to a stable alliance relationship, thereby facilitating the use of 
relationship routines for acquiring and experimenting with new knowledge (Stettner and Lavie, 2014). 
Given a coherent learning environment, the perceived positional control influences the small firm to 
the extent that is neither too strong to stimulate new knowledge creation nor too weak to preserve an 
effective exploration routine (McGrath, 2001). Thereafter, the small firm is willing to foster strong 
and proactive alliance relationships to gain persistent support (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984). Such a 
matching state could then entail knowledge exploration with low R&D risk because of the 
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anticipatable investments and controllable behaviors.  
Therefore, this study hypothesizes that, 
Hypothesis 3: Balanced position-driven power and capability-driven power is positively associated 
with knowledge exploration. 
Similarly, balanced position-driven power and capability-driven power may positively relate to 
knowledge exploitation. As mentioned above, perceived capability forces help enhance relational 
exchange that promotes the acquisition of complementary assets, while perceived positional 
advantages ensure that the small firm focuses on the specific technology area to improve, refine, or 
commercialize existing products. To strike a balance between the two types of power is to foster an 
atmosphere in which the benefits of both can be released and the constraints being alleviated, thereby 
driving the small firm’s exploitative behaviors in the direction of value co-creation (Adner and 
Kapoor, 2010). Thereafter, the small firm could have a positive attitude towards coordinating 
inter-related activities and is likely to comply in the face of perceived power imbalance. Such an 
attitude leads the small firm to invest in improving product quality or reducing production cost, with 
the purpose of making the exchange relationship stronger (Frazier and Rody, 1991). This study then 
proposes, 
Hypothesis 4: Balanced position-driven power and capability-driven power is positively associated 
with knowledge exploitation. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
The empirical setting is China’s high-tech industry. China has become one of the largest economic 
entities in the world. The development of high-tech industries has been paid enormous attention and is 
now considered a national strategy for boosting economic growth. Total R&D expenditure in China 
exceeded $300 billion in 2014, which is more than the sum of the total R&D of 28 European Union 
member countries (OECD, 2014). In 2013, China filed 21,516 international patent applications, 
ranked third in terms of total number (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2014). In addition, 
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China’s high-tech industries have witnessed numerous alliances for pursuing collaborative R&D (Gu 
and Liu, 2014). All these factors indicate that this setting is suited to the present study. The data was 
collected in the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and Beijing district—the three most 
developed areas in China, which account for 45.8% of gross domestic production and 69.7% of the 
country’s total high technology output. A sampling frame of 500 high-tech firms from a list compiled 
by regional Science and Technology Departments in these areas was obtained.  
  The questionnaire was originally designed in English and then translated into Chinese by two 
independent translators familiar with management research. The back-translation was conducted with 
special attention being paid to eliminating misunderstanding. To ensure face and content validity, the 
authors interviewed 15 senior managers and 6 scholars to refine the question items. The questionnaire 
was finalized after conducting a pretest with 32 top or senior managers.  
While a choice of multiple informants might have been preferable, this study selected one top 
manager (general manager/president/CEO) or senior manager who was involved in strategic decisions 
and worked closely with the top manager in each firm as the key informant. Prior studies have 
demonstrated that senior managers are familiar with interfirm collaboration issues as well as 
innovation-related knowledge (Li et al., 2010), and provide information as reliable and valid as that 
from multiple informants (Li and Zhang, 2007; Zahra and Covin, 1993).  
Following Rodan and Galunic (2004), this study invited the informants to participate in a 
computer-based survey. To ensure a high response rate, the authors first contacted local government 
departments (e.g., Department of Science and Technology, regional Economic and Information 
Technology Commission or Development and Reform Commission) and asked them for help in 
coordinating the survey. Government support can be especially helpful in obtaining valid and 
complete information in emerging economies such as China (cf., Zhao and Chadwick, 2014). The 
informants who agreed were asked whether their firms had been or were currently involved in alliance 
relationships in which the partners were significantly more advantageous than themselves in terms of 
revenue, technological capability, reputation, or position in the value chain. A total of 38 firms 
claimed no such relationships and were excluded from the sample. Borrowing from Yang et al. (2014) 
who defined small firms as those with revenue of less than $100 million and large firms as those with 
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revenue of more than $1 billion, the present study included sample firms that had dominant partners 
with annual revenue of more than 10 times theirs. This measure clearly demonstrated the comparative 
advantage a dominant partner might hold over the small firm, thus enabling the investigation of the 
imbalance of power. After finalizing the sample list, the authors sent each informant a diskette 
containing a letter explaining the background and instructions. The computer-based questionnaire was 
then sent by email. The authors also provided the contact information of a research team member so 
that the informants could make inquiries if necessary. To avoid potential social desirability bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003), the informants were asked to complete the questions as honestly as possible 
as there were no right or wrong answers, and it was ensured that the informants’ responses were 
anonymous and confidential. After completion, the informants replied via email, attaching the 
completed questionnaires. Overall, 229 questionnaires were received (a response rate of 45.8%). After 
excluding uncompleted and unusable responses, the final sample consisted of 205 firms from various 
high-tech industries (electronic and information technology, 41.5%; new energy and new material, 
16.1%; mechanic and electronic equipment, 19.5%; new pharmaceuticals and bioengineering, 10.2%; 
others such as aerospace and semiconductors, 12.7%). The authors checked the non-response bias by 
comparing the responding firms and non-responding firms in terms of firm age and size, and found no 
significant difference. 
 
3.2 Measurement 
The questionnaire was developed on the basis of previous studies and theories. This study used 
existing measures and question items whenever possible. All the perceptual items were rated based on 
a seven-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), and are summarized in the 
Appendix. 
Dependent variables. The measurements of exploration and exploitation were adapted from He and 
Wong (2004). Specifically, the scale of exploration indicates activities including (1) introduce new 
generation of products, (2) extend product range, (3) open up new markets, and (4) enter new 
technology fields. The scale of exploitation indicates activities including (1) improve existing product 
quality, (2) improve production flexibility, (3) reduce production cost, and (4) improve yield or reduce 
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material consumption.  
Independent variables. To measure perceived power, the authors asked the respondents to rate the 
extent to which they perceive that the dominant partner impose decisions by (1) administrating the 
distribution of resources, (2) controlling knowledge/information flows, (3) dominating the design of 
rules, (4) controlling value extraction and distribution, (5) intervening in the development of product 
technologies, (6) influencing the strategies of market expansion, and (7) deciding on the ways of 
knowledge integration. This study developed each item of this scale based on a careful review of 
literature. It highlights the attributes of perceived power for imposing decisions emphasized by Hunt 
and Nevin (1974) and Frazier and Rody (1991). The first four items capture the positional dimension 
of intra-dyad power a small firm may perceive. They reflect perceived power that are coercive, and 
that are dependent on bargaining position and the stakes of a small firm in a given relationship. The 
last three items concern the capability dimension of intra-dyad power. The influences reflected in 
these items can be less coercive than that in the first four items, and are less likely related to economic 
punishments. When developing the items, the literature that specifies positional or capability attributes 
of intra-dyad power was reviewed (e.g., Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Perrons, 2009). The authors first extracted elements from the literature that may reflect the meaning of 
perceived position-driven power or capability-driven power. Specifically, the review of literature 
suggests that there are at least four behaviors associated with position-driven power: resource 
allocating (Emerson, 1962; Johnson et al., 1993; Olsen et al., 2014), rules designing (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2006; Olsen et al., 2014), value extracting and distributing (Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney, 
2010; Jap, 2001), and knowledge flow administrating (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Mudambi and 
Navarra, 2004). Resource allocating refers to the influence on allocating valuable resources. Rules 
designing is related to the domination of coordination rules that the small firms should obey when 
interacting with their dominant partners. Value extracting and distributing concerns the power to 
extract and distribute collaboration interests among partner firms. Knowledge flow administrating 
shows the aspect of power that can be leveraged in dominating the flow of knowledge. Each of these 
behaviors is based on dominant firms’ positional advantages, and has been identified as an important 
element of power exercise process. Similarly, the authors identified three behaviors relating to 
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capability attributes of power, namely, intervening in product development (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002; Perrons, 2009), influencing market expansion (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gawer, 
2009), and coordinating knowledge integration (Patel and Pavitt, 1997). Intervening in product 
development is associated with a dominant partner’s capability advantage that can be leveraged for 
promoting the small firm’s product development. Influencing market expansion concerns a dominant 
partner’s role in guiding the small firm’s market expansion behaviors. Coordinating knowledge 
integration refers to a dominant partner’s capability advantage which helps promote the small firm’s 
knowledge integration and absorption. Face-to-face interviews with managers and scholars were 
conducted, inquiring if there were other behaviors that should be included or some of the seven 
behaviors that should be removed. The authors then conducted a pilot study to explore the factor 
structure of intra-dyad power, and finalized the item pool. Collectively, it is expected that these items 
capture some essence of intra-dyad power. Following Venkatraman (1989) and He and Wong (2004), 
this study operationalized the complementary effect by creating the interaction term and 
mean-centered the two power variables prior to it; the authors operationalized the balanced effect by 
calculating the deviation score between the two variables (i.e., ∣perceived position-driven power－
perceived capability-driven power∣) and subtracting the deviation score from 7. The measure was 
reversed so that a higher value indicated a higher level of balance.  
Control variables. This study controlled for variables that had been found to affect knowledge 
exploration, and variables that could be related to alliance relationship (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; 
Yang et al., 2014; Zhou and Li, 2012). At the firm level, the control variables that this study used 
included firm size (i.e., the natural log of the number of employees), firm age (the number of years 
since founding), ownership (1=state-owned, 0=otherwise), and type of industry (0=electronic and 
information technology, 1=otherwise). This paper also controlled for R&D competence with three 
items adapted from Yam and colleagues (2011) reflecting the quality, speed, and effectiveness of 
transferring and applying knowledge among manufacturing, design, and development. At the 
interfirm level, this study controlled for duration (the number of years of collaboration), equity (1=yes, 
0=no), and relationship substitutability, which indicated the possibility of the firm finding a new 
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relationship to replace the original one. Following Zhou and Li (2012), the present study controlled 
for environmental variables, including competitive intensity and technological dynamism. Competitive 
intensity was measured using three items: promotion wars, competitive responses, and the extent of 
intensity. Technological dynamism was measured using two items indicating the speed and the 
provided opportunities of the technological change. 
 
3.3 Construct validity 
This study used exploratory factor analysis to reduce the seven items of intra-dyad power into two 
variables that could be explained as perceived position-driven power and perceived capability-driven 
power (Table 2). Confirmatory factor analysis was then conducted to test the construct validity. The 
fit indexes of the two-factor model indicated that the overall model fit the data well (CMIN/DF=2.059, 
GFI=0.973, CFI=0.985, IFI=0.985, RMSEA=0.072). The standardized factor loadings were above 0.7, 
with all items loaded significantly on the corresponding latent constructs (p=0.000), thus showing 
convergent validity. A chi-square difference test between a one-factor model and a two-factor model 
showed good discriminant validity (p=0.000). The 95 percent confidential interval around the 
correlation estimates between perceived position-driven power and perceived capability-driven power 
did not include a value of one, again indicating discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). 
To assess the scales’ internal consistency and reliabilities, this study computed Cronbach’s alpha, and 
observed that both were well above the recommended threshold of 0.7 (0.882 for perceived 
position-driven power and 0.821 for perceived capability-driven power).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
------------------------------------ 
In the same way as described above, this study estimated separate first-order measurement models 
for the remaining multi-item variables (exploitation, exploration, R&D competence, competitive 
intensity, and technological dynamism) to assess construct validity and reliability (overall model fit 
indexes: CMIN/DF=1.806, GFI=0.912, CFI=0.941, IFI=0.943, RMSEA=0.063). The authors ran a 
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series of chi-square difference tests in pairs for all constructs including perceived position-driven 
power and perceived capability-driven power to compare the one-factor model with the two-factor 
model, and checked if the 95 percent confidential interval around the correlation estimates included a 
value of one. Both showed discriminant validity. Cronbach’s alpha was tested to assess the reliability. 
All scales except competitive intensity had reliability greater than 0.7. The Cronbach’s alpha of 
competitive intensity was 0.672, which is acceptable for questionnaire scales (Zhang and Li, 2010). 
Given the strong factor loadings and face validity, it is reasonable to consider it as a control variable 
(cf., Zhang and Li, 2010).  
 
3.4 Measures to control for common method biases 
Because the questionnaires were filled by the same informants, this study took special care of 
controlling common method biases. Procedurally, the present study included interactions (perceived 
position-driven power×perceived capability-driven power) in the models, which are less likely to be 
influenced by common method bias (Siemsen, Roth, and oliveira, 2010). To reduce the concern of 
social desirability bias, the authors ensured that the informants’ responses were anonymous and 
confidential, and asked the informants to complete the questions based on their exact situations 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Statistically, Harman’s one-factor test was used to check for the presence of common method bias 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The authors subjected all measure items to a factor analysis. The results 
indicated a solution representing 64.95% of total variance, with the first factor only accounting for 
21.79%, suggesting that common method bias was not a major concern. Exploratory factor analysis 
was also conducted by fixing the number of factors to be one. The result suggested that the variance 
explained by this factor was 22.7%, well below the 50% threshold. Single-factor test was then 
conducted using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) suggested by Malhotra, Kim, and Patil (2006). 
The lack of fit of the single-factor measurement model again indicated that common method bias was 
not a major issue (CMIN/DF=6.436; GFI=0.572, CFI=0.364, IFI=0.371, RMSEA=0.164). Further, 
following Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) recommendation, an artificial common method variable was added 
 21
into the measurement model, with all items loaded on this variable and on the seven multi-item 
variables simultaneously. The fit indices were slightly better than that of the seven-factor model 
(CMIN/DF=1.745; GFI=0.871, CFI=0.921, IFI=0.923, RMSEA=0.061). While the chi-square 
significantly decreased (∆χ2=30.197, ∆df=1, p<0.01), the variance extracted by the common method 
factor was 0.26, well below the threshold of 0.5. This study then introduced a marker variable to 
further check the common method variance (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Richardson, Simmering, and 
Sturman, 2009). The authors selected technological modularity, which refers to ‘the intentional 
decoupling of interoperating subsystems of a larger system’ (Tiwana, 2008, p.770), as the marker 
variable, loading the measurement items of all variables (including technological modularity) on 
themselves and on the common method variable simultaneously. The result showed that the variance 
extracted by the common method factor was 0.24, again denying the presence of common method 
biases. 
In addition, to alleviate the concern of a single informant, this study further contacted and collected 
information of intra-dyad power from 35 dominant partners (questionnaires completed by senior 
managers of these firms), and compared this information with that collected from the small firms (35 
pairs of large-small alliances). The means of true value of position-driven power and capability-driven 
power collected from dominant partners were 4.257 (compared to 4.100 of that of the corresponding 
small firms) and 5.191 (compared to 5.419 of that of the corresponding small firms), both of which 
were close to the perceived value by the small firms. Two independent sample T-tests for perceived 
position-driven power and perceived capability-driven power, respectively, showed that the 
information from the dominant partners was not significantly different from that of the small firms 
(t=0.449 for perceived position-driven power and -1.368 for perceived capability-driven power). 
These results indicate that having a single informant would not have a significant impact on the 
analysis. All these measures indicate that common method biases were not a major issue. 
  
4. Results 
This study report regression results with robust standard errors, which can be helpful in eliminating 
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the concern of heteroskedasticity. To check for potential problems of multicollinearity, the authors 
assessed the variance inflation factors (VIFs) associated with each of the predictors in the models. The 
value of VIFs ranges from 1.087 to 1.694, well below the 10.0 threshold, indicating multicollinearity 
was not an issue. The variables perceived position-driven power and perceived capability-driven 
power were mean-centered before creating the interaction term to reduce possible collinearity 
between main and interaction effects.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
------------------------------------ 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations among the constructs are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression models. Exploitation is the dependent variable in Models 
1 to 4, while in Models 5 to 8 exploration is the dependent variable. Models 1 and 5 only introduced 
control variables. Models 2 and 6 added the main effects of perceived position-driven power and 
capability-driven power. Models 3 and 7 added the effect of the complementary term, while Models 4 
and 8 added the effect of the balanced term. 
Models 2 and 6 show that neither perceived position-driven power nor capability-driven power 
have any direct impact on either exploitation or exploration, implying that the dominant partner is 
unable to stimulate the small firm’s learning behaviors using merely one type of intra-dyad power.  
In Hypothesis 1, the present study proposed that perceived position-driven power and 
capability-driven power complement each other in driving exploitation. As shown in Model 3, the 
complementary effect of the two types of power is significant for exploitation (b=0.068, p＜0.05), in 
support of Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 proposed that a complementary position-driven power and 
capability-driven power positively relates to exploration. The results in Model 7 suggest that the 
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complementary effect is positive and significant (b=0.058, p＜0.1), thus supporting Hypothesis 2.  
In Hypothesis 3, this study posited that a balanced position-driven power and capability-driven 
power would have a positive impact on exploration. As shown in Model 8, the balanced term is 
positive and significant (b=0.165, p＜0.05), thus confirming Hypothesis 3. With Hypothesis 4, the 
present study considered whether a balanced effect existed for driving exploitation. The results in 
Model 4 indicate that the balanced term is positive and not significant (b=0.048, p＞0.1). Hypothesis 
4 is thus not supported.  
 
5. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effects of perceived position-driven power and 
capability-driven power in driving exploration versus exploitation. Using survey data from 205 
high-technology firms from China, the present study found that complementary position-driven power 
and capability-driven power was associated with both exploration and exploitation. These findings 
provide evidence that perceived power imbalance in alliances can be an impetus of organizational 
learning if exercised properly. The complementary effect of the two types of power implies a way to 
integrate diverse interfirm forces for driving exploration and exploitation, which otherwise would not 
be achievable if focusing solely on either of them.  
The analysis also revealed that a balanced position-driven power and capability-driven power is 
positively related to exploration, while no such an effect is found in terms of exploitation. This 
counterintuitive result deserves further attention, which can be explained as follows. Compared to 
exploitation, exploration is associated with higher risks in terms of knowledge appropriation and 
innovation failure (Katila et al., 2008). As discussed above, the balanced effect of these two types of 
perceived power can be helpful in reducing these risks because of the anticipatable investments and 
controllable behaviors. The higher the R&D risks, the higher the need for a balanced state of 
perceived positional and capability-driven power. Therefore, the balanced effect should be more 
crucial to exploration than to exploitation. Regarding the specific result of exploitation, the 
insignificant relationship can also be understood. In most situations, exploitation acts as a strategy to 
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obtain economic reinforcements in interfirm relationships. As long as the small firm perceive the 
exercise of the power by the dominant partner (not necessarily balanced), it will be stimulated to 
pursue a reasonable return from exploitation activities.  
 
5.1 Implications to theory  
This paper has potentially important theoretical implications. Prior studies on small firms’ 
organizational learning when allying with large, dominant firms center on how one certain source of 
power affects the small firms’ knowledge acquisition (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Li and Rowley, 
2002). This study, however, implies that the examination of inter-organizational learning in 
asymmetric alliances requires a switch of focus from a single power source to a holistic view on how 
different power sources can be combined to avoid their negative effects. This is important because 
small firms conducting inter-organizational learning normally hold more than one disadvantage over 
their dominant partners which jointly predict their learning strategies. By focusing on the multiplicate 
influences of diverse power sources on exploration and exploitation, this study bridges the literature 
on the exploration/exploitation paradigm (Holmqvist , 2004; Stettner and Lavie, 2014) and the studies 
on power-dependence relations between alliance firms (e.g., Cheng, 2012). Interestingly, the findings 
show that the combination of position-driven and capability-driven power can be positive when 
affecting small firms’ learning. This challenges the wisdom that large partners’ power could be 
harmful to small firms’ motivation to explore in novel knowledge areas (e.g., Katila et al., 2008). It 
implies that small firms aiming at exploration/exploitation may choose dominant partners that hold 
both positional and capability advantages. Indeed, intra-dyad power relates not only to dominant 
partners’ decision enforcement but also to how small firms react to such enforcement behaviors. In 
this regard, a power-dependence relation can be a motivational force driving organizational learning. 
In examining two different configurations of position-driven power and capability-driven power, 
namely complementarity and balance, the present study shows that a balanced position-driven power 
and capability-driven power has different impacts on exploration versus exploitation whereas a 
complementary position-driven power and capability-driven power has similar impacts. This finding 
adds to the understanding of power-learning relationship by unveiling how power may affect 
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exploration and exploitation in different ways (e.g., Perrons, 2009), indicating that the configuration 
of power sources matters when conducting different learning strategies. Such a finding also contrasts 
to Yang et al. (2014) who assert that small firms allying with large partners create more value from 
exploitation than from exploration. More importantly, it implies that the relative strength of different 
types of power (as shown by the balanced effect) determines how these power sources interact with 
each other in affecting organizational learning. This is intriguing given that existing literature on both 
bargaining power and resource dependence has only referred to the strength of one certain type of 
power (Johnson et al., 1993; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). It is then necessary to take into 
consideration both functions and strengths of different types of power when they work in combination. 
The strategy of power configuration is thus crucial for understanding small firm’s inter-organizational 
learning in asymmetric alliance and could be a direction for future research. Moreover, while this 
study does not investigate risk in exploration and exploitation, the significant effect that a balanced 
position-driven power and capability-driven power has on exploration and its insignificant effect on 
exploitation shows the possibility that the configuration of different types of power could be a pushing 
force that motivates small firms to take risks in knowledge learning. In this sense, the orchestration of 
an asymmetric relationship refers to the intervention of small firms risk-taking initiatives.  
Further, extending existing studies that examine either the exercise of power between organizations 
(e.g., Gaski, 1984; Olsen et al., 2014) or the existence of dependence that may damage collaboration 
in an alliance (Elking et al., 2017), this paper shows that the perception of power imbalance will lead 
to actions being taken to leverage the relationship. This is an important step because it implies that 
small firms will respond to power imbalance before being enforced decisions. It also implies that 
small firms can develop a proactive approach to managing dependence asymmetry such that the 
liabilities of power imbalance such as conflicts or cost (Villena and Craighead, 2017) can be reduced. 
As suggested by Reimann et al. (2017), a dominant partner firm cannot simply neutralize power 
imbalance by not consciously using its power. The focus on perceived power could thus help 
understand a chain reaction through which the small firm perceives power imbalance, takes 
corresponding actions, and consequently stimulates the dominant partner’s power exercise. Compared 
to studies that rely on coercive nature of power to explain organizational learning (e.g., Cheng, 2012), 
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the delineation of perceived power clearly indicates a social-psychological process through which a 
small firm in an asymmetric alliance can be stimulated to conduct learning. By connecting power 
perception and exploration and exploitation strategies, this study provides with alternative insights 
into how small firms manage their alliances with dominant partners. 
 
5.2 Implications to practice 
One obvious practical implication is the need for managers of small firms to understand how to 
leverage the relationships with large firms and to drive learning. While power is exercised to 
appropriate value from the alliance relationship, it also leaves space for small firms to acquire 
resources that might be crucial for their growth. Managers of small firms need to better understand the 
benefits of exercising power rather than stubbornly considering how to escape dependence. They 
should also proactively recognize the potential power their dominant partners have and design 
corresponding mechanisms through which they can interact with those partners. For example, if the 
managers of small firms perceive exercise of position-driven power and capability-driven power 
simultaneously, they should positively respond to the power and devote energy to developing new 
knowledge. 
  Another implication from this study is the need for managers of the small firms to reasonably 
choose their strategies of exploration versus exploitation when encountering power imbalance. As 
suggested in the present study, different configurations of perceived position-driven power and 
capability-driven power (i.e., complementarity and balance) lead the small firms to adopt different 
learning strategies (exploration versus exploitation). The adoption of a specific strategy depends 
largely on the small firms’ perception of power imbalance. If the two types of perceived power have 
similar strengths, managers of the small firms should adopt exploration rather than exploitation 
strategy; if they complement each other in coordinating interfirm activities, managers of the small 
firms can introduce either exploration or exploitation.  
 
5.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
This study is subject to several limitations, which provide directions for future research. First, the 
 27
authors only collected data from the small firms of the alliance relationships. Consequently, this study 
was unable to identify the factors from the dominant partner side that might affect the model. While 
the independent and dependent variables are all about small firms, which alleviates this concern, 
future research might benefit from replicating the model with data that includes information from both 
sides of the asymmetric relationships. Moreover, small firm’s perception of power and dominant 
partner’s power exercise may jointly demonstrate a dynamic, iterative process in which one side 
responds to the other’s behaviors and adjusts its own during their interactions. Such a process may 
change the small firm’s initiative in conducting exploration versus exploitation. A study on this issue 
can be promising. 
Second, the conceptualization of this study is primarily based on the power-dependence approach, 
which raises the concern that it might have overlooked other factors identified in previous studies. 
Future research will have to overcome this limitation and enhance the understanding of strategic 
phenomena by integrating different theoretical perspectives (e.g., embeddedness, reciprocity, 
institutional theory, etc.), focusing on their interaction effects on exploitation and exploration. For 
example, the process through which a dominant partner exercises power may relate to the shape and 
reshape of small firm’s cognition of the relationship, and the cognitive changes may help to explain 
the small firm’s learning behaviors. A longitudinal study on this issue can enrich the understanding of 
exploration and exploitation strategies in asymmetric alliances. 
Finally, the combination of perceived position-driven power and capability-driven power may vary 
significantly across different industries, and the treatment of setting an industry dummy may fail to 
reflect such variance. For example, a small firm of an emerging industry might perceive less power 
imbalance than that of a mature industry; small firms in high technology industries may have different 
attitudes toward power imbalance from those in traditional manufacturing industries. Due to sample 
size limitations, the present study was only able to use an aggregated industry dummy as a control 
variable. Future research could assemble a larger sample size with the potential to statistically 
examine the effects of perceived positional and capability power in different industries, and configure 
these two to stimulate exploration and exploitation. This can be done by exploring the impacts of 
industry competition, market or technology uncertainty in the industries, stage of industry lifecycle, 
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technology intensity in the industries, etc. 
 
6. Conclusion 
While organizational learning theory has referred to power-dependence relationships in alliances, it 
is still unclear how the interaction of different types of power might affect exploration and 
exploitation in asymmetric alliances. This study takes an initial step, examining joint effects of 
different types of perceived power imbalance on exploration and exploitation with a sample of 
Chinese high-tech firms. By differentiating between perceived position-driven power and 
capability-driven power, the findings show that these two exert influence in combination rather than 
independently. This study shows a complementary effect between them for driving both exploitation 
and exploration. It is also suggested that they have a balanced effect for promoting exploration. 
However, the present study fails to find evidence that the balanced effect exists for exploitation. These 
results suggest that despite the concern of potential conflict caused by power (Gaski, 1984), a 
combination of perceived power can be helpful in stimulating small firms’ initiatives to launch 
exploitative and exploratory learning. The findings could help to improve the understanding of 
power-dependence relationships that widely exist in alliances, and stimulate further discussion on the 
mechanisms in which power can be used to encourage collaboration and to drive learning and 
knowledge creation.  
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TABLES: 
 
Table 1 Comparison between position-driven power and capability-driven power 
 Position-driven power Capability-driven power 
Description 
The potential to enforce decisions by 
advocating positional advantages 
The use of advantageous capabilities 
or resources to influence partner firms 
Source of power Positional advantages Capability advantages 
The nature of influence exerted 
Rewards and punishments Guidance on upgrading technical or 
marketing capacity 
Coerciveness Coercive Soft 
Force direction when affecting partners Pushing Pulling 
 
Table 2 Factor analysis for intra-dyad power 
Question items Position-driven power capability-driven power 
1. administrating the distribution of resources .825 .155 
2. controlling knowledge/information flow .834 .093 
3. dominating the design of rules .857 .189 
4. controlling value extraction and distribution .873 .166 
5. intervening in the development of product technologies .207 .821 
6. influencing the strategies of market expansion .048 .885 
7. deciding on the ways of knowledge integration .204 .826 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Explained 
variance: 74.23% 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Firm age 2.863 1.015             
2. Firm size 2.668 0.817 .528            
3. Type of industry 0.590 0.494 .102 .098           
4. Duration  2.605 1.096 .440 .351 .022          
5. Equity  0.230 0.421 .085 -.131 -.059 .049         
6. Relationship substitutability 4.171 1.762 .123 .016 .144 .144 .125        
7. Technological dynamism 5.154 1.277 -.126 -.030 -.167 -.018 .016 -.096       
8. Competitive intensity 4.320 1.194 .019 .017 .041 -.061 .006 .119 .196      
9. R&D competence 5.098 1.077 -.115 .161 -.007 -.018 -.172 .000 .247 -.078     
10.Position-driven power 4.476 1.344 .018 -.060 .033 .116 .032 .205 .228 .067 .001    
11.Capability-driven power 4.852 1.178 -.092 -.187 -.106 .087 .046 .108 .243 .077 -.050 .347   
12. Exploration 5.366 0.869 -.161 .014 -.050 .015 -.100 -.155 .317 -.082 .414 .069 .009  
13. Exploitation 5.515 0.937 -.102 .110 -.019 .083 -.058 -.027 .191 -.072 .541 .094 .080 .571 
Note: Correlations equal to or greater than ｜0.116｜are significant at 0.10 level. 
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Table 4 Hierarchical regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses 
 Exploitation Exploration 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Firm age -0.113 
(0.077) 
-0.111 
(0.076) 
-0.114 
(0.077) 
-0.113 
(0.077) 
-0.097 
(0.075) 
-0.100 
(0.076) 
-0.103 
(0.076) 
-0.106 
(0.078) 
Firm size 0.063 
(0.090) 
0.090 
(0.092) 
0.073 
(0.093) 
0.083 
(0.092) 
-0.008 
(0.079) 
-0.011 
(0.083) 
-0.026 
(0.082) 
-0.033 
(0.083) 
Type of industry 0.012 
(0.118) 
0.016 
(0.115) 
-0.001 
(0.116) 
0.014 
(0.115) 
0.035 
(0.115) 
0.024 
(0.114) 
0.010 
(0.114) 
0.018 
(0.112) 
Duration 0.109* 
(0.065) 
0.091 
(0.065) 
0.099 
(0.064) 
0.096 
(0.066) 
0.073 
(0.063) 
0.073 
(0.064) 
0.080 
(0.063) 
0.088 
(0.063) 
Equity relationship 0.100 
(0.146) 
0.107 
(0.146) 
0.103 
(0.144) 
0.121 
(0.144) 
-0.049 
(0.136) 
-0.049 
(0.137) 
-0.052 
(0.137) 
-0.050 
(0.137) 
Relationship 
substitutability  
-0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.028 
(0.032) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
-0.061* 
(0.032) 
-0.064* 
(0.034) 
-0.062* 
(0.033) 
-0.073** 
(0.035) 
Technological 
dynamism 
0.042 
(0.049) 
0.013 
(0.050) 
0.008 
(0.050) 
0.015 
(0.049) 
0.155*** 
(0.047) 
0.153*** 
(0.049) 
0.148*** 
(0.049) 
0.158*** 
(0.047) 
Competitive intensity -0.025 
(0.051) 
-0.026 
(0.050) 
-0.016 
(0.049) 
-0.022 
(0.051) 
-0.057 
(0.047) 
-0.056 
(0.046) 
-0.048 
(0.046) 
-0.044 
(0.044) 
R&D competence 0.445*** 
(0.055) 
0.454*** 
(0.054) 
0.436*** 
(0.056) 
0.453*** 
(0.054) 
0.273*** 
(0.062) 
0.272*** 
(0.062) 
0.256*** 
(0.065) 
0.269*** 
(0.062) 
Position-driven power  0.047 
(0.050) 
0.022 
(0.049) 
0.027 
(0.064) 
 0.036 
(0.048) 
0.014 
(0.045) 
-0.032 
(0.054) 
Capability-driven power  0.064 
(0.056) 
0.115* 
(0.063) 
0.075 
(0.061) 
 -0.034 
(0.059) 
0.010 
(0.067) 
0.003 
(0.059) 
Complementarity   0.068** 
(0.033) 
 
  0.058* 
(0.035) 
 
Balance    0.048 
(0.080) 
   0.165** 
(0.072) 
F value 12.47*** 11.10*** 10.12*** 10.09*** 7.28*** 5.87*** 5.84*** 5.40*** 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.291 0.305 0.289 0.225 0.220 0.231 0.241 
Notes: The variance inflation factors range from 1.087 to 1.694. 
*** p＜0.01. ** p＜0.05. * p＜0.1 (sample size=205) 
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Appendix Measurement items a 
Items description Standardized loading 
Position-driven power (newly developed)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.882 
Rate the extent to which the dominant partner influences the decision-making of your firm by, 
1. administrating the distribution of resources 0.850 
2. controlling knowledge/information flow  0.701 
3. dominating the design of rules 0.911 
4. controlling value extraction and distribution 0.868 
Capability-driven power (newly developed)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.821 
Rate the extent to which the dominant partner influences the decision-making of your firm by, 
1. intervening in the development of product technologies 0.769 
2. influencing the strategies of market expansion 0.789 
3. deciding on the ways of knowledge integration 0.777 
Model fit:  
CMIN/DF=2.059, GFI=0.973, CFI=0.985, IFI=0.985, RMSEA=0.072 
Knowledge exploitation (He and Wong, 2004)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.814 
Our innovation: 
1. improve existing product quality 0.606 
2. improve production flexibility 0.700 
3. reduce production cost 0.671 
4. improve yield or reduce material consumption 0.754 
Knowledge exploration (He and Wong, 2004)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.769 
Our innovation: 
1. introduce new generation of products 0.649 
2. extend product range 0.700 
3. open up new markets 0.772 
4. enter new technology fields 0.584 
R&D competence (Yam et al., 2011)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.759  
1. high quality and quick feedbacks from manufacturing to design and R&D 0.848 
2. the great extent of market and customer feedback into technological innovation process 0.883 
3. the good mechanisms for transferring technology from research to product development 0.476 
Technological dynamism (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993) Cronbach’s alpha=0.757  
1. the technology in our market is changing rapidly 0.798 
2. technological changes provide big opportunities in our industry 0.786 
Competitive intensity (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993)  Cronbach’s alpha=0.674  
1. competition in our market is cutthroat. 0.721 
2. there are many “promotion wars” in our market. 0.683 
3. anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily. 0.515 
Model fit:  
CMIN/DF=1.806, GFI=0.912, CFI=0.941, IFI=0.943, RMSEA=0.063 
a. we also subjected all multi-item variables into the same model and the results suggested that the overall model fit the data 
well (CMIN/DF=1.882, GFI=0.860, CFI=0.906, IFI=0.908, RMSEA=0.066). 
 
